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Highlights
•	 To	reinvigorate	the	building	of	new	gas	infrastructure	in	Europe,	the	Euro-
pean	Union	has	introduced	‘projects	of	common	interest’	(PCI)	in	its	Energy	
Infrastructure	Package.	These	PCIs	will	be	evaluated	and	selected	on	the	basis	
of	systematic	cost-benefit	analysis	(CBA),	a	method	that	is	novel	for	the	Euro-
pean	gas	industry.	A	consistent	gas-CBA	method	has	to	be	designed	by	ENT-
SOG,	who	published	a	preliminary	draft	method	for	public	consultation	on	
25	July	2013,	followed	by	a	formal	draft	CBA	method	on	15	November	2013.	
•	 This	Florence	School	brief	summarizes	our	findings	and	recommendations	
for	improvement	of	the	CBA	method.
•	 The	time	horizon	of	the	CBA	can	be	controversial.	Projects	can	be	evaluated	
against	different	time	horizons	and	these	horizon	options	affect	the	relative	
ranking	of	the	projects.	A	single	reference	point	for	20-25	years	is	best	prac-
tice	for	the	time	horizon	for	infrastructure	projects	and	should	be	used	for	
gas	CBA.
•	 Project	interaction	affects	the	net	economic	benefits	of	projects	that	are	com-
plementary	or	competing	with	other	proposed	infrastructure	projects.	Iden-
tification	of	interaction	can	be	treated	within	the	gas-CBA	method,	providing	
important	information	for	ranking	individual	or	clustered	projects.
•	 The	monetization	model	can	and	must	be	internally	consistent	with	regard	to	
physical	and	commercial	relations	that	govern	the	European	gas	system.	The	
model	output	needs	to	be	aligned	with	a	reduced	list	of	significant	effects	and	
the	model	input	needs	to	be	monitored.
•	 Ranking	should	be	primarily	based	on	the	monetization	with	transparent	ad-
justments	where	justified;	ENTSOG	should	provide	guidance	to	the	Regional	
Groups	on	how	the	CBA	method	has	been	conceived	for	selecting	projects.
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Context of cost-benefit analysis
It	is	estimated	that	over	70	billion	euro	will	need	to	be	invested	
in	large-scale	gas-infrastructure	projects	in	Europe	in	the	next	
decade.	While	an	industry-wide	consensus	on	this	need	exists,	
the	 European	 authorities	 observe	 that	 many	 projects	 are	 at	
risk	of	not	being	realized	by	 the	2020	horizon	due	 to	several	
investment	barriers.	To	help	investors	overcome	these	barriers	
and	to	reinvigorate	the	development	of	trans-European	energy	
networks,	 the	EU	adopted	–	as	part	of	a	 larger	Energy	Infra-
structure	 Package	 –	 a	 revised	 Regulation	 on	 trans-European	
infrastructure.	
The	Regulation	 foresees	 identifying	and	 selecting	 ‘projects	of	
common	interest’	(PCI)	through	a	multi-stage	process	as	 fol-
lows.	Project	promoters	nominate	a	gas-infrastructure	project	
to	 one	 of	 four	Regional	Groups	 that	 reflect	 the	 priority	 cor-
ridors	 established	 by	 the	 European	 Commission.	The	 nomi-
nated	projects	are	subsequently	evaluated	and	selected	by	the	
Regional	Groups	on	the	basis	of	a	cost-benefit	analysis	(CBA).	
In	a	final	step,	the	regional	lists	of	PCIs	are	then	merged	into	a	
union-wide	list	adopted	by	the	Commission.	
The	 evaluation	 and	 selection	 of	 PCIs	 based	 on	 a	 systematic	
cost-benefit	analysis	of	gas-infrastructure	projects	is	a	method	
that	is	novel	in	the	European	gas	industry	in	terms	of	its	scale	
and	purpose.	ENTSOG	has	made	a	first	effort	to	design	a	con-
sistent	and	comprehensive	CBA	method.	In	the	following	steps	
of	 this	 long	design	process,	ACER,	 the	Commission	 and	 the	
Member	 States	will	 extensively	 review	 the	 proposed	method	
before	it	is	adopted	by	the	Commission.	
This	brief	is	then	taking	stock	of	the	draft	method	published	by	
ENTSOG,	existing	best	practices	in	gas-infrastructure	project	
evaluation	and	Florence	School	of	Regulation’s	framework	for	
systematically	 reviewing	 CBA	 methods.1	 It	 presents	 recom-
mendations	 on	 four	 areas	 in	 the	 gas-CBA	 method	 that	 are	
potentially	controversial:	(1)	the	time	horizon	of	the	CBA,	(2)	
project	 interaction,	 (3)	monetization	models	and	(4)	 ranking	
of	the	projects.	
1.	 Meeus,	L.,	von	der	Fehr,	N.H.,	Azevedo,	I.,	He,	X.,	Olmos,	L.,	Glachant,	
J.M.,	 2013.	Cost	 Benefit	Analysis	 in	 the	Context	 of	 the	 Energy	 Infra-
structure	 Package.	 Florence	 School	 of	 Regulation	 Policy	 Brief,	 Issue	
2013/02.	ISSN	1977-3919.
Recommendations for cost-benefit 
analysis for gas-infrastructure projects
We	 present	 recommendations	 to	 cope	 with	 four	 potentially	
controversial	 areas.	These	 areas	 are:	 (1)	 time	 horizon	 of	 the	
CBA,	 (2)	 project	 interaction,	 (3)	 monetization	 models	 and	
(4)	ranking	of	the	projects,	which	are	consecutively	discussed	
below.
1. Time horizon
Recommendation 1: Projects can be evaluated against different 
time horizons and these horizon options affect the relative net 
present values of projects; A single reference point for 20-25 years 
is best practice for the time horizon for infrastructure projects 
and should be used for gas CBA.
It	 is	common	for	 infrastructure	projects	 to	have	a	horizon	of	
20	to	25	years	for	the	analysis,	even	if	the	project	will	provide	
benefits	for	a	longer	horizon	as	is	the	case	for	pipelines,	under-
ground	 storage	 and	 LNG	 terminals.	 ENTSOG	 acknowledges	
20	 to	 25	 years	 to	 be	 best	 practice,	 but	 concerns	 have	 been	
expressed	that	such	a	horizon	would	not	be	able	to	effectively	
assess	projects	with	different	commissioning	dates.	
Computing	the	net	present	value	(NPV)	of	project	benefits	is	
best	practice	to	compare	projects	with	different	timings	of	the	
costs	 and	 benefits.	This	method	has	 been	designed	 for	 com-
paring	projects	with	the	same	reference	point,	which	refers	to	
the	 start	 of	 the	 investment,	 and	 the	 same	 planning	 horizon,	
which	refers	to	the	lifetime	of	the	investment.	To	accommodate	
the	 comparison	 of	 projects	 effectively	 having	 different	 refer-
ence	points,	 there	 is	no	perfect	 adjustment.	Multiple	options	
can	then	be	conceived	to	define	a	time	horizon	against	which	
the	net	present	value	can	be	calculated;	three	of	these	options	
are	illustrated	in	Figure	1	and	discussed	below.	
Option 1	consists	of	modifying	the	analysis	to	match	the	tradi-
tional	NPV	method.	To	this	end,	all	projects	can	be	presumed	
to	have	been	commissioned	at	the	same	time	(N)	with	the	same	
operational	lifetime	of	e.g.	20	years.	The	NPV	scores	then	reveal	
the	relative	priority	of	projects	with	that	timing.	However,	the	
economic	cash-flows	might	not	be	a	correct	representation	of	
the	 cash-flows	 when	 the	 project	 is	 effectively	 commissioned	
later.
Option 2	consists	of	creating	a	separate	time	horizon	for	each	
project	 based	 on	 its	 expected	 commissioning	 date	 (C)	 and	
operational	lifetime.	The	NPV	is	first	calculated	for	the	horizon	
running	from	C	to	C+20	and	subsequently	discounted	to	the	
common	time	reference	N.	This	option	takes	into	account	the	
expected	economic	cash-flows.	However,	it	disregards	the	later	
cash-flows	of	projects	commissioned	earlier	while	the	implicit	
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horizon	of	analysis	extends	to	20	years	after	the	last	commis-
sioned	project.	
Option 3	consists	of	having	a	horizon	of	analysis	that	extends	
from	the	common	reference	point	N	up	to	a	certain	number	of	
years	after	N,	e.g.	20	years	or	longer	and	considers	the	projects’	
cash-flows	 that	 fall	 within	 that	 horizon.	This	 option	 implies	
that	 there	 is	 a	 cut-off	 point	 for	 the	 calculation	 of	 benefits	
which	 affects	 distant-future	 projects	 more	 than	 earlier	 proj-
ects.	Because	of	the	discounting,	the	net	present	value	of	very	
distant-future	benefits	is	small;	disregarding	these	benefits	thus	
does	not	affect	the	results	significantly	for	most	projects.
Whatever	 the	option	chosen,	 it	 is	 important	 to	be	aware	that	
the	selected	method	affects	the	relative	NPV	scores	of	projects	
as	illustrated	in	Figure	1.	In	this	particular	example,	project	1	is	
the	better	project	according	to	options	1	and	2,	whereas	option	
3	 favors	 project	 2.	 We	 highlight	 that	 the	 Regional	 Groups	
should	 put	 emphasis	 on	 correctly	 evaluating	 earlier	 projects	
because	distant-future	projects	 can	and	must	be	 re-evaluated	
with	every	PCI	list	revision	when	their	benefits	become	more	
certain.	We	recommend	the	use	of	a	single	reference	point	with	
a	20-25-year	horizon	(option	1	above)	as	it	allows	identifying	
priority	projects	on	an	equal	footing.
2. Project interaction
Recommendation 2: Project interaction is important and can be 
treated within the cost-benefit analysis; the Regional-Group level 
is better suited to carry out cost-benefit analysis that accounts for 
project interaction.
The	 PCI	 candidate	 projects	 are	 added	 to,	 and	 interact	 with,	
an	existing	gas	system.	Moreover,	the	gas	system	evolves	over	
the	horizon	of	analysis	because	other	infrastructure,	PCI	and	
non-PCI,	is	commissioned.	Complementary	projects	then	gen-
erate	higher	benefits	 if	built	 together;	competing	projects,	on	
the	other	hand,	reduce	each	other’s	individual	value	when	built	
together.	Project	 interaction	 is	 important	 information	for	 the	
Regional	Groups	 and	 project	 promoters	 and	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
treat	it	in	the	baseline	definition	and	in	the	project	definition	of	
the	CBA	method.
Within	 the	 baseline	 definition	 of	 the	 CBA	 method,	 two	
approaches	can	be	used	to	track	down	competing	and	comple-
mentary	 projects.	 First,	 each	 project	 can	 be	 assessed	 against	
two	baselines,	one	without	any	of	the	PCI	candidates	and	one	
with	all	of	them	or	a	specific	subset	of	proposed	PCI	projects.	A	
significantly	diverging	value	then	indicates	interaction	without	
identifying	the	projects	involved.	A	second	approach	consists	
of	systematically	having	pairwise	comparison	of	projects’	com-
bined	and	individual	values	against	either	of	the	two	baselines.	
Such	an	approach	would	allow	identification	of	the	interacting	
projects,	but	would	be	time	and	resource	consuming.	Whatever	
approach	is	chosen,	the	Regional	Group	level	is	better	suited	to	
carry	out	CBA	accounting	for	project	interaction.	Indeed,	such	
analysis	requires	information	from	all	projects	whereas	project	
promoters	only	have	access	to	their	own	projects.	The	regional	
groups	 are	 also	 better	 placed	 to	 define	 subsets	 of	 projects	 to	
create	the	double	infrastructure	baseline.	
The	 CBA	 method’s	 project	 definition	 should	 facilitate	 the	
tracking	 down	 of	 project	 interaction	 in	 two	ways.	 First,	 suf-
ficiently	 detailed	 project	 information	 is	 needed	 in	 terms	 of	
technology	type,	geography	and	engineering	features	to	allow	
the	proper	delineation	of	individual	de-clustered	projects.	This	
information	can	assist	 in	 the	 tracking	down	of	 the	particular	
projects	that	are	interacting.	In	fact,	 it	 is	best	practice	in	gas-
infrastructure	studies	on	the	project-promoter	level	to	compare	
competing	project	 alternatives	 on	 the	 aforementioned	 terms.	
Second,	project	promoters	should	be	stimulated	to	bring	their	
Figure 1. 
Net present value for two projects against three possible horizons: (1) single reference point N (presumed commissioning dates 
C1=C2=N) and 20 years of operation (N>N+20), (2) two reference points (C1=3 and C2=9) and 20 years of operation discounted to 
common time reference (N>C1+20 and N>C2+20), and (3) single reference point N and 20 years horizon (N>N+20) with projects 
commissioned at C1=3 and C2=9, respectively (own depiction).
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complementary	projects	into	a	single	project	cluster,	providing	
evidence	 of	 the	 complementarities.	 It	 is	 already	 an	 industry	
practice	to	cluster	several	projects	that	belong	together,	such	as	
many	pipeline	sections	of	a	long-distance	pipeline.
3. Monetization models
Recommendation 3: Monetization models consist of input, 
output and an algorithm.
The	addition	of	a	new	piece	of	infrastructure	has	several	effects.	
The	monetization	of	these	effects	requires	models	to	be	inter-
nally	 consistent	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 physical	 and	 commercial	
relations	that	govern	the	gas	system.	Due	to	the	novelty	of	CBA	
for	 evaluating	 and	 selecting	 gas-infrastructure	 projects	 on	 a	
European	 or	 regional	 scale,	 there	 is	 limited	 experience	 with	
the	application	of	such	models.	Yet	many	models	exist	or	can	
be	conceived	to	capture	specific	benefits.	In	this	brief,	we	thus	
limit	our	study	to	the	minimum	requirements	of	such	models	
to	ensure	internal	consistency,	characterizing	a	model	by	(1)	its	
output,	(2)	its	input	and	(3)	the	algorithm	that	links	the	two.
Output
Recommendation 3a: The monetization-model output needs to 
be aligned with a reduced list of significant effects.
The	output	requirements	of	the	model	should	be	aligned	with	
the	effects	to	be	monetized.	Some	effects	are	significant	for	all	
projects,	making	up	the	reduced	list	of	effects	to	be	monetized.	
Some	effects	can	be	significant	 for	specific	projects,	 in	which	
case	 additional	 analysis	 should	 be	 carried	 out.	 Finally,	 some	
effects	can	be	dismissed	from	the	monetization	for	the	reasons	
explained	below.
The	 reduced	 list	 of	 significant	 effects	 starts	 from	 a	 compre-
hensive	 effect	mapping	 that	 includes	 three	 levels:	 (1)	 the	 gas	
system,	(2)	the	externalities	and	(3)	the	macro-economic	level	
(Figure	2).	
(1)	Gas-system	effects	can	be	further	categorized	as	infrastruc-
ture	costs,	supply-cost	savings,	gross-consumer	surplus,	secu-
rity	benefits	and	other	market	benefits.	Infrastructure costs	are	
a	 significant	 effect	 for	 all	 projects.	They	 are	 obtained	 as	 part	
of	 the	financial	 analysis	 for	 the	project	 and	no	 further	mon-
etization	is	needed.	Supply-cost savings	refer	to	all	supply-side	
effects	 of	 a	 project.	They	 are	 significant	 for	 all	 projects	 and	
should	be	monetized.	Gross-consumer surplus encompasses	all	
demand-side	savings	as	well	as	changes	 in	the	capacity	rents.	
This	 effect	 should	 also	be	monetized.	Note	 that	 in	 this	 effect	
mapping,	 inter-temporal	 arbitrage	 profits	 through	 storage	
and	trading	are	included	in	the	demand-side	and	supply-side	
effects.	Security benefits	refer	to	the	impact	of	a	project	in	case	
of	a	disruption	for	whatever	reason.	These	benefits	can	be	sig-
nificant	 for	 some	projects,	but	 they	can	and	 should	be	mon-
etized	via	 the	supply-side	and	demand-side	savings,	applying	
dedicated	probability-weighted	gas-disruption	scenarios	in	the	
input	of	the	monetization	model.	Other market benefits	such	as	
increased	 competition	or	 liquidity	 can	be	 significant,	 but	 are	
likely	to	be	similar	within	a	region.	They	can	thus	be	dismissed	
for	most	projects.	Indicators	can	signal	cases	for	which	this	pre-
sumption	is	not	correct	in	which	cases	supplementary	analysis	
is	justified.	
(2)	Externalities	comprise	increased	sustainability	and	integra-
tion	of	renewable	energy,	CO2	costs	and	other	environmental	
costs.	Sustainability and renewable energy improvements	should	
be	internalized	in	the	demand	and	supply	assumptions	in	the	
input	of	the	monetization	model.	CO2 costs	should	be	internal-
ized	in	the	demand	assumptions	for	gas	through	the	European	
carbon	 price.	 Other	 social and	 environmental costs such	 as	
landscape	costs	should	be	integrated	into	infrastructure	costs	
as	they	are	linked	to	construction	and	other	requirements	that	
have	 to	 be	 met	 by	 the	 project.	 Separately	 monetizing	 these	
externalities	could	lead	to	double	counting	of	the	same	benefit.	
Finally,	 (3) Macro-economic effects	 of	 infrastructure	 invest-
ments	can	be	significant,	but	are	likely	to	be	of	the	same	order	
of	magnitude	 in	 the	defined	Regional	Groups	 and	 thus	 their	
dismissal	from	the	monetization	will	not	significantly	affect	the	
relative	values	of	projects.
Supply-	 and	 demand-side	 savings	 are	 then	 the	 two	 retained	
effects	 for	 the	monetization,	 noting	 that	 infrastructure	 costs	
Figure 2. 
Comprehensive effect mapping; the inner ring represent effects 
in the gas system, the middle ring are externalities and the outer 
ring the macro-economic effects (own depiction).
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are	already	monetized.	While	 it	 is	possible	to	monetize	some	
of	the	other	benefits	that	can	be	significant	for	some	projects,	
severely	more	complex	algorithms	would	be	needed.	To	calcu-
late	the	supply-side	and	demand-side	savings,	the	output	of	the	
monetization	model	 should	 then	at	 least	 include	price	 levels,	
consumption	 levels,	 and	 supplied	 quantities	 from	 domestic	
production,	spot	trade	and	long-term	contracts.	
Input
Recommendation 3b: The monetization-model input should be 
monitored for the explicitness and transparency of its assump-
tions and for the validity and accuracy of its data.
The	 input	 side	 of	 the	model	 is	most	 critical	 as	 it	 determines	
the	 quality	 of	 the	 output.	 Therefore,	 assumptions	 must	 be	
transparent	and	well	documented,	and	data	must	be	validated	
or	benchmarked	and	it	must	be	accurate	e.g.	in	terms	of	time	
and	space.	Furthermore,	the	model	must	be	flexible	enough	to	
accommodate	multiple	input	scenarios,	e.g.	normal	operation	
and	dedicated	security	scenarios.	
Assumptions	 are	 needed	with	 regard	 to	 the	demand for gas,	
which	 can	 be	 an	 explicit	 or	 implicit	 function	 of	 relative	 fuel	
prices	 and	 of	 externalities	 that	 have	 been	 internalized	 as	
explained	in	the	previous	section.	In	general,	a	simple,	yet	vali-
dated,	‘engineered’	demand	function	will	be	sufficient.	On	the 
supply side,	 cost	and	other	contract	parameters	 such	as	min-
imum	and	maximum	levels	need	to	be	defined	for	 long-term	
contracts,	 for	 local	production	capabilities,	 for	LNG	supplies,	
which	can	also	be	 long-term	contracts,	and	 for	underground	
storage,	 which	 has	 both	 demand	 and	 supply	 characteristics.	
Finally,	assumptions	are	needed	with	regard	to	the	physical	and	
commercial	network	capacities.	Note	 that	 the	physical	 trans-
port	 capacity	 of	 a	 gas	 system	 is	 determined	 dynamically	 by	
its	configuration	and	operation,	and	that	the	addition	of	new	
infrastructure	can	lead	to	significant	changes	thereof;	improp-
erly	using	technical	capacities	results	in	overestimation	of	the	
feasible	gas	flows	and	their	related	benefits.	
Algorithm
Recommendation 3c: The monetization-model algorithm needs 
to ensure internal consistency of physical and commercial rela-
tions while making trade-offs between higher accuracy of the 
monetization model and increased computational complexity.
The	algorithm	forms	the	backbone	of	the	model	and	is	subject	to	
a	number	trade-offs.	First,	the	time	must	be	defined	in	terms	of	
the	time	horizon	(e.g.	1	week,	20	years…)	and	the	time	step	(e.g.	
hourly,	summer/winter…)	of	the	model.	Second,	space	must	be	
defined	in	terms	of	the	area	considered	by	the	model	and	the	
granularity	of	the	model.	The	area	considered	by	the	model	can	
start	from	the	‘region	of	analysis’	that	is	defined	in	the	Regula-
tion.	The	spatial	granularity	can	range	from	domestic	networks	
to	market	zones	and	their	interconnectors,	which	can	be	mod-
eled	individually	or	as	aggregated	border	capacity.	There	is	no	
right	or	wrong	in	specifying	time	and	space;	there	is,	however,	
a	trade-off	between	higher	accuracy	(smaller	time	step,	more	
granularity),	on	the	one	hand,	and	finer	data	requirements	and	
more	computational	complexity,	on	the	other	hand.	Finally,	the	
algorithm	needs	internally	consistent	constraints	that	prescribe	
the	relations	between	the	input	and	the	output.	In	the	case	of	
a	gas	system,	network	constraints	ensure	the	physical	balance	
of	the	system,	whereas	commercial	constraints	define	balance	
between	import,	production,	(virtual)	trade,	storage	and	con-
sumption.	This	 consistency	 also	 includes	 the	 specification	 of	
appropriate	boundary	conditions	that	link	model	outcomes	if	
sequential	monetization	models	or	model	runs	are	used.
Gas-dispatch	models	 can	be	made	 compliant	with	 the	 afore-
mentioned	input,	output	and	algorithm	requirements	and	can	
be	used	to	monetize	those	effects	that	have	been	identified	as	
significant	 for	 all	 projects.	The	monetization	 of	 other	 effects	
that	are	very	significant	for	specific	projects	requires	monetiza-
tion	models	with	much	more	complex	algorithms	that	can	cap-
ture	strategic	behavior.	Finally,	if	several	monetization	models	
are	used	to	capture	the	different	effects,	it	is	important	that	the	
output	is	aggregated	in	a	consistent	way	to	allow	a	correct	com-
parison	between	projects.
4. Ranking of the projects
Recommendation 4: Ranking should be primarily based on the 
monetization with transparent adjustments where justified; 
ENTSOG should provide guidance to the Regional Groups on 
how the CBA method has been conceived for selecting projects.
ENTSOG	does	not	address	ranking	in	its	draft	method	because	
the	 ranking	and	selection	of	projects	 is	 the	exclusive	compe-
tence	 of	 the	Regional	Groups.	Nevertheless,	 ENTSOG’s	 con-
ception	of	the	CBA	method	predetermines	how	its	output	can	
be	used	for	selection	of	PCI	projects,	essential	information	the	
Regional	Groups	should	be	aware	of.	
Ranking	should	be	primarily	based	on	the	monetization.	How-
ever,	 transparent	 adjustments	 might	 be	 justified	 to	 accom-
modate	 certain	 considerations.	 In	 this	 brief,	 we	 discuss	 five	
such	potential	concerns:	double	counting,	project	interaction,	
uncertainty,	regional	specificity	and	project-type	specificity;	all	
these	concerns	can	be	treated	within	the	CBA	method.	
First,	double counting of	an	effect	distorts	the	ranking	of	proj-
ects.	This	distortion	can	be	avoided	by	having	a	proper	reduced	
list	 of	 significant	 effects.	 Second,	 the	 Regional	 Groups	must	
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be	informed	about	how	project interaction	has	been	dealt	with	
in	the	CBA	method	and	how	the	ranking	should	be	adjusted.	
Third,	 the	 benefits	 of	 some	project	might	 be	more	uncertain	
than	those	of	other	projects.	The	Regional	Groups	need	infor-
mation	on	the	robustness	of	the	benefits.	This	information	can	
be	 provided	 by	 means	 of	 a	 sensitivity	 analysis	 to	 the	 major	
determinants	of	the	costs	and	benefits.	It	is	also	important	that	
the	outcome	of	such	sensitivity	analysis	 is	reported	in	a	clear	
and	informative	way.	Fourth,	the	method	of	ranking	can	differ	
according	 to	 regional specificity.	 ENTSOG	 should	 provide	
guidance	on	how	the	CBA	method	can	reflect	 this	specificity	
e.g.	through	the	adjustment	of	the	monetization	model	to	cap-
ture	strategic	behavior	for	projects	in	a	region	with	less	mature	
markets.	Fifth,	and	final,	we	did	not	find	evidence	suggesting	
that	project-type specificity	requires	significantly	different	CBA	
methods.	The	Regional	Groups	should	be	aware	that	all	project	
types	can	and	should	be	evaluated	with	the	same	CBA	method.	
Conclusion
The	conception	of	a	method	for	cost-benefit	analysis	 for	gas-
infrastructure	projects	is	a	challenging	task.	It	requires	making	
choices	on	potentially	controversial	issues.	The	reviewing	pro-
cess,	 to	 which	 this	 brief	 contributes	 with	 its	 four	 structural	
recommendations,	will	help	improve	the	method	to	become	a	
robust	tool	for	evaluating	and	selecting	gas-infrastructure	proj-
ects	of	European	interest.		
